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Lynne Copson is Lecturer in Criminology at the Open University. Her 
research focuses on zemiology and its relationship to criminology 
particularly in terms of their implications for understanding ‘harm’ and 
realising ‘justice’, and utopianism (particularly the idea of using utopia 
as a method); and the intersections between academic research and 
public engagement. 
 
BEYOND ‘CRIMINOLOGY VS. ZEMIOLOGY’: RECONCILING CRIME WITH 
SOCIAL HARM 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since its emergence at the start of the twenty-first century, zemiology and the 
field of harm studies more generally, has borne an ambiguous and, at times, 
seemingly antipathetic relationship with the better-established field of 
criminology.  Whilst the tension between the perspectives is, at times, 
overstated, attempts to reconcile the perspectives have also proved 
problematic, such that, at present, it appears that they risk either becoming 
polarized into mutually antagonistic projects, or harmonized to the point that 
zemiology is simply co-opted within criminology.  Whilst tempting to view this 
as nothing more than an academic squabble, it is the central argument put 
forward in this chapter that the current trend towards either polariziaton or 
harmonization of the criminological and zemiological projects, risks 
impoverishing both perspectives, both intellectually and, more fundamentally, 
in terms of their capacity to effect meaningful social change.  To this end, this 
chapter offers a critical reflection of recent attempts to reconcile the social 
harm perspective with criminology, focussing in particular on Majid Yar’s 
attempts to do so using the concept of ‘recognition’ derived from critical 
theory.  It is suggested that such attempts, whilst important in the contribution 
they make to developing a theory of harm, are necessarily flawed by their 
reliance on an implicit assumption of a shared conception of harm 
underpinning both the concept of ‘crime’ and ‘social harm’.  By contrast, it is 
the central argument put forward in this chapter that zemiology and 
criminology are best understood as divergent normative projects which, whilst 
sharing many of the same goals with regards to the improvement of the 
criminal justice system and the tackling of social problems, differ primarily in 
the means by which they seek to achieve these.  Therefore, rather than 
denying this debate through the collapsing of one perspective into the other, 
or polarizing them into hostiles camps, it is only by recognising the nature of 
this debate and fostering dialogue between the perspectives that we can 
achieve our shared goals and effect meaningful change. 
.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, zemiology and the field of social harm studies has emerged as part 
of a project concerned to move ‘beyond criminology’ (Hillyard et al., 2004a).  
Central to this endeavour is a commitment to the idea of ‘harm’ as a 
fundamentally more useful concept than ‘crime’ for understanding and 
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addressing a whole host of harmful social phenomena that we experience 
‘from cradle to grave’ (Hillyard & Tombs, 2004: 18).  In its emergence, 
zemiology has also constituted a site of tension and ambiguity for criminology, 
raising questions about the very project of criminology and its relationship to 
power.  In particular, in terms of its initial reception, questions have arisen as 
to whether zemiology is best understood as an extension or supplement to 
existing criminological theory, thereby constituting a new theoretical 
contribution within contemporary criminology, or a radical alternative to it. 
 
Taking the emergence of zemiology and its apparent tension with criminology 
as a starting point, this chapter explores the relationship between zemiology 
and criminology. Whilst early indications appeared to suggest an ambiguous 
relationship between zemiology and criminology, increasingly it appears that, 
at least for those invested in them, these perspectives risk either becoming 
polarized into competing projects or harmonized to the point that issues of 
social harm are simply, and apparently unproblematically, co-opted into the 
raison d’être of criminology.  However, it is the central argument of this 
chapter that either approach: polarization or harmonization, at least in its 
current form, risks impoverishing both the criminological and zemiological 
projects, as well as their capacity to effect meaningful social change.   
 
Specifically, I argue that, insofar as a central theme within early sociological 
and more explicitly critical and radical criminologies has been to raise 
awareness of the problematic use of the criminal justice system as a means of 
recognising and responding to what are, properly speaking social problems, 
both zemiology and criminology are animated by a concern to appropriately 
apportion responsibility for, and address the causes of, harm. Likewise, 
zemiology does not necessarily commit its proponents to the abolition of crime 
or the criminal justice system per se, but rather suggests its reservation for 
responding to genuinely culpable acts of individual harm, which can only be 
identified once broader structural harms have been recognised and 
addressed. As such, the aim of this chapter is to suggest that what is at stake 
in the tension between zemiology and criminology is not a question of ultimate 
ends (e.g. addressing or at least reducing harm) but about the more effective 
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means, and the appropriate starting point for realising these ends. However, 
so long as the projects of criminology and zemiology are seen as being in 
tension, the contribution of each is in danger of being undermined, with a risk 
of academic infighting and navel-gazing between different ‘disciplines’ and 
fields of study overshadowing the development of constructive and 
meaningful policy responses to social problems.  
 
CRIMINOLOGY, ZEMIOLOGY AND SOCIAL HARM 
Since its emergence as a distinct field of study at the start of the twenty-first 
century, zemiology has borne a somewhat ambiguous and at times 
problematic relationship to criminology. Variously described as “a new field of 
study” (Kauzlarich & Matthews, 2006: 17 [emphasis added]), a “significant and 
fast expanding contemporary variant of critical criminology” (Burke, 2005: 179 
[emphasis added]) and “a new perspective from which to approach the study 
of crime and criminal justice” (Whyte, 2005: 488), zemiology arguably 
occupies a contested position in terms of its relationship to criminology (see 
Reiman, 2006). This is reflected in questions as to whether zemiology 
presents a development within critical criminology or an alternative to it. For 
example, from Whyte’s review of Beyond Criminology it is not altogether clear 
the extent zemiology is identified as an alternative to, rather than a 
continuation of, criminology. The characterization of the text as “truly 
groundbreaking” (Whyte, 2005: 488) suggests it is in some ways importantly 
divergent from all that has preceded it, whilst the designation of zemiology as 
proposing “a new perspective from which to approach the study of crime and 
criminal justice” (Whyte, 2005: 488) reasserts its primary locus as residing in 
the subject matter typically identified as the territory of criminology. By 
contrast, other interpretations (such as that of Burke (2005)), explicitly 
characterise zemiology as a type of criminology, suggesting, perhaps, it is 
akin to other variants within criminology such as abolitionism or feminist 
criminology. 
 
At the same time, it also seems that there is a growing recognition that 
zemiology might not be so simply or unproblematically subsumed within 
criminology. The significance of zemiology and its critique of 
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contemporary approaches to tackling problems of crime and justice, 
reflected in the growing visibility of zemiology and/or social harm 
references in criminology subject benchmarks and curricula (Hillyard & 
Tombs, [forthcoming]) suggests awareness that the identification of 
zemiology with criminology cannot necessarily be assumed. However, 
this has only resulted in further confusion over, and problematisation of 
their relationship (Hillyard & Tombs, [forthcoming]). This includes, more 
recently, not only a questioning of the relationship between zemiology 
and criminology but, in attempting to further clarify (or perhaps establish) 
a distinction between the two, raising questions as to whether zemiology 
is also best understood as distinct from ‘social harm’ more generally 
(Hillyard & Tombs, [forthcoming]; see also Pemberton, 2008: 84). This 
subsequent distinction (between zemiology and ‘social harm’) appears to 
stem from a recognition of the legacy of the concept of social harm 
within criminology (cf., Hulsman, 1986; Muncie, 2000; Tifft & Sullivan, 
2001), and subsequent concern to distinguish the zemiological project 
from the critical criminological one by some of its most prominent 
architects (Hillyard & Tombs, [forthcoming]). 
 
CRIMINOLOGY VS. ZEMIOLOGY 
Whilst space precludes a more detailed analysis, a reciprocal tension 
between zemiology and criminology can thus be identified. Without wishing to 
deny the variety of perspectives and positions occupied by those engaged in 
the criminological and zemiological enterprises respectively, nor to 
essentialize these perspectives, to generalise, from a zemiological standpoint, 
criminology is seen as problematic insofar as it: 
(i) constructs harm in particular problematic ways  
(ii) reifies the criminal justice system 
(iii) reinforces existing (liberal individualist) models of causation and 
responsibility (see, for example, Hillyard et al., 2004; Copson, 2016; 
Hillyard & Tombs, [forthcoming]). 
 
Alternatively, from a criminological standpoint, zemiology is seen as 
problematic insofar as it: 
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(i) colonises existing approaches or themes within critical criminology 
and re-presents them as ‘novel’ and peculiar to zemiology 
(ii) denies the role of the criminal justice system (and, by extension, 
criminology) in effecting meaningful social change  
(iii) fails to articulate a clear alternative basis for its own theorising of 
and response to, social problems (see, for example, Zedner, 2011). 
 
The result of this apparent tension between zemiology and more established 
modes of criminological thought has been an increasing polarization of 
criminology and zemiology into seemingly opposing hostile camps. 
Consequently, on the one hand, key proponents of the zemiological or social 
harm perspective have explicitly sought to distance their work from that of 
‘criminology’. Simon Pemberton, for example, identifies his project as helping 
to develop social harm as an ‘oppositional’ discourse to that of crime (2015: 
6.), maintaining that  
 
“if the social harm debate remained within the confines of criminology, it would be 
stuck within a conceptual cul-de-sac, whereby the individualising tendencies of the 
criminal law would constrain the possibility of producing systematic and holistic 
analyses of harm” (Pemberton, 2015: 6).  
 
On the other hand, equal antipathy has been shown from critical 
criminologists who have argued that zemiologists’ claims to offer harm as an 
alternative to crime essentially amounts to a repackaging of pre-existing 
criminological theorising under a new name, thereby denying the way in which 
harm has provided a key site of investigation and critique within criminology. 
In particular, they challenge the extent to which zemiology presents a radical 
break with the established critical tradition within criminology (cf. Muncie, 
2005; Hughes, 2006). Indeed, the notion of social harm has been used in 
direct conjunction with that of crime, with crime often presented as one form of 
social harm within a wider range of socially injurious behaviours (cf. Room, 
2000; Nutt et al., 2007; Cain & Howe, 2008). This usage arguably reflects a 
long-established critical criminological project of expanding the object of 
criminological study away from crime as legally defined (whilst avoiding the 
  6 
problems of designating such behaviours as criminal in the absence of a 
violation of criminal law). Primarily, this aims to decouple the study of crime 
and criminal justice from the operations of state power and control. This is 
reflected in a litany of criminological studies seeking to develop the concept of 
crime and thus provide a means of addressing harmful behaviour not currently 
included in or prosecuted by the criminal justice apparatus (albeit implicitly at 
times through the presumption of such areas as proper for criminological 
interrogation in the first place). This includes attempts to recognise as criminal 
(or rather better recognise as criminal): harmful actions of states and 
corporations, human rights violations, environmental and ecological harms, 
poverty, and homelessness (cf., for example, Schwendinger & Schwendinger 
(1975); Barak & Bohm (1989); Cohen (1993); Green & Ward (2004); Walters 
(2006); Whyte (2007); Felices-Luna (2010)). Essential to such endeavours is 
a resistance on the part of criminologists to becoming simply a “scientific 
‘alibi’” (Garland, 1992: 404-405) for the existing social order, maintained and 
legitimated through the criminal justice apparatus. As a result, questions arise 
as to whether the emphasis on social harm advanced by proponents of the 
zemiological perspective necessarily requires “the abandonment of 
criminology” (Muncie, 2005: 200), or whether zemiology should instead 
operate alongside, thereby supplementing existing approaches towards harm 
and justice (cf. Muncie, 2005; Reiman, 2006).   
 
If zemiology’s claims to offer harm as an alternative to crime essentially is 
considered, at best, a repackaging of preexisitng criminological theorising 
under a new name, at worst, it stands accused of denying the centrality of the 
concept of harm to the notion of crime and risks reinforcing the 
compartmentalisation of knowledge production and the suppression of 
normative theorising in twenty-first century academic thought (see Zedner, 
2011: 277-278; also Copson, 2013; 2014).   
 
For example, Lucia Zedner has questioned the social harm perspective’s 
“central claim […] that it makes no sense to distinguish between criminal and 
other harms” (2011: 273), arguing that  
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“[t]his assertion fails to recognize that the construction of crime is necessarily a 
normative exercise and one in which criminology, alongside criminal law, has an 
important role to play in determining which principles should underpin its definition, 
policing and punishment” (Zedner 2011: 274).   
 
Moreover, Zedner contends, “[i]n a legal system grounded on individual 
autonomy there are good reasons to identify criminal wrongdoing and to 
punish those who perpetrate it. Failure to do so constitutes a denial of 
individual autonomy” (2011: 274).  In addition, central to Zedner’s account is a 
view of the criminal law and its application as a fundamentally normative 
endeavour concerned not only to hold individuals accountable but also, and 
crucially, to limit the power of the state to interfere with individuals’ conduct 
and to protect them from its excesses in a way that does not apply in other 
areas of policy or law.  As such, she concludes,  
 
“before criminologists capitulate to the call to abandon crime (and with it criminology) 
they might think more critically about the claims made for alternative approaches and 
consider the positive restraints and protections entailed in criminal law and procedure” 
(Zedner 2011: 276). 
 
 
RECONCILING CRIME WITH HARM  
At the same time as there has been an apparent growing antipathy between 
some scholars of crime and justice on the one hand and advocates of social 
harm on the other (most notably social harm theorists who explicitly reject any 
affiliation of their project with that of criminology (see Pemberton, 2015; 
Hillyard & Tombs, [forthcoming])), there also appear increasing numbers of 
other critical scholars who talk about ‘crimes and harms’ collectively, that is 
under the same umbrella.  This is reflected in the growing incorporation of 
issues of social harm into criminology curricula noted above, as well as in the 
inclusion of issues of social harm/zemiology in mainstream criminology 
conferences noted by Hillyard and Tombs ([forthcoming]). Resisting any 
tendency towards polarization between zemiology and criminology, these 
scholars seek to add social harm/zemiology to the criminological raison d’être 
  8 
– to which some of the arguments included in this edition themselves bear 
witness. 
 
Whilst recognising the apparent tensions between zemiology and criminology, 
instead of polarization here one finds a project of harmonization with attempts 
made to reconcile zemiology and criminology. Of particular note are Yar’s 
(2012a; 2012b) recent attempts to resolve the tensions between zemiology 
and criminology through the use of critical theory and the concept of 
recognition. Attributing much of the ambiguity in the relationship between 
zemiology and criminology to an ‘ontological deficit’ (2012a: 59) in that which 
“distinguishes the harmful from the non-harmful” (2012a: 59), for Yar, the 
problem stems from the fact that a “lack of specificity leaves the concept of 
harm lacking the very same ontological reality that is postulated as grounds 
for rejecting the concept of crime” (2012a: 59). Thus, whilst ‘harm’ is lauded 
by advocates of the social harm perspective for its independence from formal 
legal apparatus for establishing its raison d’être, without more rigorous 
definition ‘[t]he appeal to social harm is sustained by its intuitive moral-political 
appeal and ‘commonsense’ purchase, but no more” (2012a: 59). 
 
As a remedy, Yar offers ‘recognition’ as both the solution to this ‘ontological 
deficit’ of the social harm perspective, and also the means by which “to 
dissolve the juxtaposition of ‘harm’ and ‘crime’ into competing conceptual 
alternatives” (Yar, 2012b: 116). Drawing on critical theory, and particularly on 
the work of Axel Honneth, the concept of ‘recognition’ is related to the 
capacity for self-realisation based on a view of human beings as living in, and 
formed by, an intersubjective and mutually dependent social world, as 
opposed to the liberal view of humanity as formed of pre-existent individuals 
who enter the world with a fully formed sense of self. Based on the idea that 
“[t]he individual comes to know himself, to recognise himself as a being with 
particular attributes or properties, through the acknowledgement conferred by 
an ‘other’” (Yar 2012a: 57), recognition is identified a central component in 
“forging a coherent sense of selfhood (self-esteem)”. Three key modes of 
recognition are identified: respect, esteem and love, which serve as “critical 
yardsticks […] to identify existing social, political, economic and cultural 
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arrangements that deny recognition to human beings” (Yar, 2012a: 58).  
Against this backdrop, Yar suggests a conceptualisation of social harm as 
“nothing other than the inter-subjective experience of being refused 
recognition with respect to any or all of these dimensions of need” (2012a: 
59).   
 
It is important to note that here Yar is employing a particular Hegelian notion 
of ‘recognition’ as a site of self-realisation or identification in relation to others.  
This is distinct from the more general idea of the formal recognition of 
particular rights in law.  However, in terms of resolving the tension between 
criminology and zemiology, Yar maintains that, via this account of harm as 
non-recognition (in the Hegelian sense), social harm and crime can be 
reconciled as mutually compatible since the role and function of criminal law 
should be to ensure protection of individual rights to recognition 
(notwithstanding that this may not always be realised in practice). In this way, 
Yar argues, “making recourse to recognition as the grounds of a theory of 
harms can help resolve the conflict by bringing ‘crime’ critically into the ambit 
of social inquiry” (2012b: 116). Moreover, reflecting a commitment to 
normative evaluation to which critical theory is avowedly tied, Yar claims that  
 
“[b]y using recognition as a benchmark or litmus test, we can [also] evaluate the 
common categories of crime as legitimate (or illegitimate) with reference to the basic 
needs of social subjects. This enables us to discriminate between formally constituted 
categories of crime according to their consistency with the principle of promoting 
recognition, and whether they offer protection from social harm” (Yar, 2012a: 62).   
 
Accordingly, we can then still make sense of the social harm perspective’s 
commitment to decoupling definitions of crime and applications of the criminal 
justice system from sites of power without necessarily identifying social harm 
and crime as mutually incompatible: rather, the problems lie in the way in 
which the concept of ‘crime’ may have been illegitimately applied and this 
should thus be the focus of evaluation. 
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However, even these attempts at reconciliation can be seen as problematic.  
Whilst Pemberton, credits Yar’s work inasmuch as it “correctly […] focuses 
our attention on the relational nature of harm, allowing us to consider the 
injuries of social isolation, as well as misrecognition of harm” (2015: 19), he 
also suggests that “the needs Yar identifies are inevitably highly subjective in 
nature” (2015: 19). Therefore, in terms of its capacity to offer an ontological 
account of what, exactly, harm is, the approach is perhaps less satisfying than 
it initially purports and questions of “how emotional needs such as love and 
esteem are operationalized in empirical study” are left “for future social harm 
analyses to resolve” (2015: 19). 
 
However, this criticism does not challenge Yar’s position or his aim per se 
(namely to reconcile crime and social harm): rather, it simply highlights a 
limitation as to what it provides as an account of social harm. That said, whilst 
Pemberton perhaps (understandably) overlooks Yar’s commitment to the 
language of crime in favour of his contribution to the development of social 
harm, in a field where, as Pemberton (2015) highlights, such contributions are 
often lacking), for Hillyard and Tombs ([forthcoming]), Yar’s approach is more 
fundamentally problematic. They point out that, ‘”for many of the social harms 
upon which [they] and others have focussed, law and rights are likely to be of 
very little relevance at all” (Hillyard &Tombs, [forthcoming]).   
 
Indeed, whilst recognition of the basic rights we all have simply by virtue of 
our existence as humans has been important for affording individuals 
protections from violations and excesses of power, as has often been seen  
(most notably, with the formal enshrinement of human rights in international 
law (see, for example, Cmiel, 2004)), the language of rights remains saturated 
by the undercurrent of individualism, taking from the outset the individual as 
the primary unit to whom such rights are both attributable and attributed. Not 
only has it been suggested that discussion of rights violations tend to focus on 
particular individuals or groups who can be identified as violating these rights, 
neglecting the way in which such violations might be located in broader 
systems of harm (see Sjoberg et al., 2001; Kennedy, 2002: 124-125), but, 
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more fundamentally, that doctrines of human rights “undergird the 
individualism of the capitalist system” (Sjoberg et al., 2001: 18). 
 
Moreover, in acknowledging rights violations (whether those of formally 
enshrined human rights or informal rights, such as Yar’s suggested right to 
recognition), there seems a general orientation towards recognising the active 
causation of harm, arguably at the expense of a recognition of harm as 
something that might equally arise, not from direct acts, but also through more 
apparently passive, ‘benign neglect’. This is reflected in the absence of the 
imposition of positive duties to assist those experiencing any form of difficulty, 
hardship or suffering where such experiences do not arise from identifiable 
events or active interventions. Obligations reside primarily in duties not to 
exacerbate or impose such experiences, rather than to alleviate pre-existing 
ones. This is not to say that measures to create positive duties to alleviate 
suffering are not recognised (for example, the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981)), but to 
suggest their limited effectiveness as long as they reside in a system which, it 
has been argued, is ultimately situated in the tradition of liberal individualism. 
Indeed, this is a limitation reflected in Yar’s own approach to reconciling crime 
with harm, insofar as he identifies as ‘concrete examples’ (2012b: 115) of 
harm as non-recognition:  
 
“actions such as inter-personal physical, sexual, and emotional violence within the 
family [which] acquire their specifically harmful character because they violate the 
necessary conditions for a person to establish basic self-confidence through the 
experience of love. Public (including state-sanctioned) practices of torture and abuse, 
theft, and appropriation amount to a denial of those rights that meet the need for 
dignity and equality amongst others as citizens. Practices such as market 
discrimination or symbolic denigration on the basis of gender, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation are harms in that they deny to subjects a recognition of the distinctive 
worth of their identities and ways of life.” (Yar 2012b: 115 [emphasis added]). 
 
Whilst undoubtedly instructive in its capacity to recognise the way in which 
social structures can conspire to bring about individual harm (in terms of non-
recognition), through recognition of, in particular, “market discrimination or 
  12 
symbolic denigration” on the basis of particular social identities, Yar’s account 
of harm nevertheless does not entail a positive duty to realise equality in the 
first place. More specifically, whilst it might entail a duty to ensure what has 
traditionally been termed ‘formal equality’ (see Barnard & Hepple, 2000: 562-
563) in terms of social structures, institutions and processes, it is not clear 
that it goes so far as to impose a requirement for more ‘substantive equality’ 
(see Barnard & Hepple, 2000: 564-567), nor that it recognises the absence of 
this as a basis for harm as it appears at least some of the strongest 
proponents of the zemiological perspective appear to.   
 
For example, whilst it might be considered harmful to deny equal access to 
employment opportunities or respect for family life based on gender, ethnicity, 
sexual orientation and so on, on a recognition-based conception of social 
harm, it does not necessarily entail that inequalities in the basic structures of 
society are necessarily recognised as ‘harms’, nor, subsequently, that they 
will be suitable candidates for legal intervention on this approach. In a society 
based on social stratification one may argue that we all are afforded the same 
formal recognition, irrespective of social position, but that our abilities to 
realise our own projects or sense of self is nevertheless unequal. One can 
argue that we can all enjoy the same formal recognition insofar as we all have 
the same right to education, legal representation, sexual autonomy, 
employment, etc. irrespective of gender or social class, for example. 
However, our ability to exercise those rights may be shaped by our social 
position: poorer people are less likely to have the opportunity to exercise 
those rights in the same way as wealthier people, but there is no person or 
agency barring their doing so, so it is not clear to what extent such people are 
suffering from ‘non-recognition’ and, hence, ‘harm’. 
 
That Yar’s account is limited in this respect perhaps stems from his 
commitment to focus on the criminal law.  Indeed, it is interesting and 
important to note in relation to Yar’s (2012a; 2012b) arguments about the 
normative role of the criminal law, that the recognition of, and enshrinement of 
such rights, is typically concentrated in other areas of law.  This is because, 
as Zedner (2011: 282) notes, the criminal law is concerned to protect 
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individuals from the violation of particular rights by the State.  It is not 
concerned with the positive formulation or recognition of rights by the State or 
society more generally in the first place. 
 
On this closer reading, therefore, Yar’s approach appears perhaps more a 
continuation of existing legal discourses for identifying harm, echoing those of 
critical criminologists with which proponents of zemiology have taken issue 
(see Hillyard & Tombs, 2004). For example, the title of one of Yar’s articles 
explicitly indicates that he is seeking to provide ‘a general theory of crime as 
social harm’ (Yar, 2012b [emphasis added]). That Pemberton’s criticism of 
Yar (2012a) does not extend further, therefore, is perhaps less a reflection of 
Yar’s theory, than of Pemberton’s own project: to study social harm in its own 
right, without recourse to criminology or the language to crime. Pemberton 
states:  
 
“A key challenge for those wishing to establish zemiology as a distinct field of study is 
the absence of an established definition of social harm. With few exceptions this 
literature has developed on the margins of criminology, where social harm is used as 
a means to expand the notion of crime.  […] this book seeks to develop a definition of 
social harm as an organizing concept for zemiology, a distinct field of study to that of 
criminology. Disregarding the attempts to extend the notion of crime, this literature 
offers an important departure point from which the concept of social harm may be 
developed” (Pemberton, 2015: 14).   
 
It is important to situate Pemberton’s response to Yar in this context. His 
disattending to Yar’s attempts to synthesise social harm with crime arguably 
stems from his primary interest in the use and definition of social harm per se, 
without recourse to crime. Indeed, Pemberton states that he explicitly 
excludes “literature relating to ‘criminal harm’” in his analysis of the concept of 
social harm and its various uses, “as it represents a distinct criminological 
enterprise to remedy the neglect of ‘harm’ within the discussions of ‘crime’” 
(2015: 14). Clearly, then, Pemberton either does not see Yar’s enterprise as 
part of this project or is willing to overlook this aspect of his work because 
Pemberton is more concerned with understanding and developing the concept 
of social harm itself, in abstraction from the role it has played in criminology. 
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In either case, it certainly seems important to distinguish Yar’s efforts from 
more ‘traditional’ approaches within criminology to expand the notion of crime 
to incorporate other harmful acts, typically through recourse to other (often 
legal) standards such as human rights abuses (Schwendinger & 
Schwendinger, 1975) or civil law or administrative requirements (Sutherland, 
[1949] 1983). Yar is clearly not straightforwardly seeking to expand the notion 
of crime via the provision of some alternative yardstick for defining crime in 
the same vein as these previous attempts. Rather, he is seeking to render 
compatible the projects of criminology and zemiology by identifying a shared 
ontological basis upon which they are founded. As Hillyard and Tombs 
([forthcoming]) summarise:  
 
“While acknowledging that the criminal law can be conceived as ‘a coercive instrument 
legitimated by the power of the capitalist state’ Yar argues that it is possible to adopt a 
different view of the law using a recognition theoretical standpoint. From this position, 
the law’s attempt, however “partial, flawed or misguided’, to enshrine formal codes 
and prohibitions to protect people from harm assists in securing their basic rights” 
(Hillyard & Tombs, [forthcoming]).   
 
However, insofar as it focuses on the right of recognition as the locus for 
identifying social harm and seeking to provide a synthesis of social harm with 
crime, Yar’s approach is “ultimately problematic, notwithstanding that some 
people may secure their basic rights through the criminal law and many more 
will buy into the notion of the possibility of justice” (Hillyard & Tombs, 
[forthcoming]), owing to its continued unreflective commitment to the 
discursive framework of crime. 
 
 
BEYOND ‘CRIMINOLOGY VS. ZEMIOLOGY’? 
Thus, notwithstanding the important contribution that attempts such as Yar’s 
have made in terms of trying to reconcile zemiology with criminology, the 
challenge for resolving the ambiguity between zemiology and criminology 
remains. The temptation could easily be to dismiss this as an interesting but 
irrelevant footnote to academic infighting and jostling for intellectual esteem 
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and there is certainly concern that such debates risk accusation of academic 
navel-gazing without a stronger account of why such issues matter. For many, 
the question of the terminology we use, or whether we identify as 
criminologists or zemiologists, will surely seem a luxury of the academic in 
their ivory tower, detached from the lived reality of the social problems such 
intellectual theorising claims to seek to address. In a time when the relevance 
of ‘expert knowledge’ is increasingly being called into question (see, for 
example, Loader & Sparks, 2011), there is a very real danger that such 
academic infighting only serves to reinforce its irrelevance to public life.   
 
This is not helped by the contemporary climate of knowledge production, of 
which the apparent ambiguity concerning the relationship between zemiology 
and crimnology and, particularly, the opposing tendencies towards, on the one 
hand, hostile polarization between these perspectives and, on the other hand, 
(often unreflective) co-option of zemiology within criminology, is arguably 
indicative. As increasing pressures upon academics to secure funding and 
growing insecurities regarding position and ensuring contemporary relevance 
results in increasing specialisation within, and schisms between, different 
sites of disciplinary knowledge (see Copson, 2014: 63), there is a danger that 
important normative debates are all too easily recast as academic squabbles 
and jostling for position.  
 
However, the resolution of this ambiguity between criminology and zemiology 
is important because, whilst cast as minor disputes about abstract issues, at 
its heart, it taps into normative questions about how critical scholars imagine 
their role vis-à-vis effecting meaningful social interventions that address social 
problems. The reduction of these tensions to seemingly abstract and often dry 
debates regarding terminology, reflects the increasing suppression of 
normative theorising within social research (see Copson, 2013; 2016) and 
increasing consignment of such research to playing a technical ‘supporting’ 
role in the administration of public policy (see Zedner, 2011; Loader & Sparks, 
2011). Consequently, perhaps a more fruitful starting point for understanding 
the relationship between criminology and zemiology resides in delineating 
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their respective normative projects in order to ascertain their compatibility 
and/or sites of divergence.  
 
To this extent, the argument put forward here echoes that of Yar: that 
theoretical accounts require normative engagement, starting with a more 
rigorous exploration and definition of the concept of harm by proponents of 
the zemiological perspective. It is arguably the absence of this which 
threatens to raise the hackles of those criminological and legal scholars who 
(understandably) reject the apparent implication that they are simply operating 
to legitimate the criminal justice system and existing structures of power, in 
abstract from normative theorising.   
 
However, the problem with foregoing attempts such as Yar’s to reconcile 
zemiology with criminology is a presumption that there is or must be a 
universal definition of harm that is implicit within both the work of critical 
criminologists and proponents of the zemiological perspective (e.g. harm as 
non-recognition). What is not considered is the notion that harm itself is an 
“essentially contested concept” (Gallie, 1956), nor that whilst in many respects 
looking very similar, the projects of zemiology and critical criminology might 
be, in some important way, distinct. As an ‘essentially contested concept’, 
rather than reflecting an intrinsic quality of experience, ‘harm’ may be 
considered from a sociological perspective to be a discursively constructed 
and applied label, embedded in particular normative assumptions, and 
articulated and utilised in varying ways with varying implications. The danger 
of the harmonization approach taken by Yar and others is an assumption that 
when talking about ‘social harm’, proponents of the zemiological perspective 
are necessarily invoking the same concept that has, indeed, long been drawn 
upon by critical criminologists, to the same ends. So whilst there does need to 
be a more rigorous and robust exploration of the concept of harm, the starting 
point for this analysis should not be an assumption of the compatibility of 
‘criminal harm’ with ‘social harm’ as Yar’s recognition-based account seems to 
suggest. 
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Considered thus, we can see that whilst critical criminologist and zemiologists 
may envision similar projects in terms of seeking to address social inequalities 
and to recognise and reduce the harms of the criminal justice system, the 
divergence between the perspectives lies largely in a disagreement about the 
means of achieving this. For proponents of the zemiological perspective, the 
recourse to the language of harm can be considered a deliberate strategy – a 
form of transpraxis (Henry & Milovanovic, 1991: 295; see Copson, 2016: 90-
91) – deliberately used to disrupt and challenge dominant ways of framing 
social problems without which we can only ever reify existing structures of 
thought and dominant (e.g. criminal justice) paradigms of conceptualising and 
responding to social problems. Understood thus, any attempts to subsume 
social harm within the criminology or to incorporate the study of social harm 
under a broad umbrella of ‘crimes and harms’ unreflectively as some have 
sought to do, risks undermining this strategy. This is particularly so given a 
general failure (as noted in the foregoing analysis of Yar’s (2012a; 2012b) 
work, and as highlighted by the work of Pemberton (2015)), to unpack and 
define ‘harm’ in the first place and to distinguish ‘social harm’ from ‘harm’ 
more generally.  It is worth noting that the concept of ‘harm’ itself has long 
played a key normative role in criminal law (see Zedner, 2011; Feinberg, 
1984), with the focus typically on identifying the causation of harm to others 
as a basis for restricting individual conduct, and for protecting individual rights 
vis-à-vis the state.  This is in stark contrast to the account of social harm 
proposed by proponents of the zemiological perspective, who seek to 
emphasise the social determinants of (as opposed to individual culpability for) 
harms.  To talk of ‘crimes and harms’ unreflectively, however, risks an implicit 
reification of the particular conceptualisation of harm implicit within criminal 
law, even if it does not necessarily intend this. In this context, therefore, the 
rejection of their alliance to criminology by some key proponents of zemiology 
can be understood as a deliberate political strategy, which aims to subvert the 
dominant criminological paradigm and challenge its particular (if implicit) 
conceptualisation of harm, rather than either a denial of existing critical work 
within criminology or a cynical claim to originality for the purposes of securing 
academic status and funding. 
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Equally, for proponents of a criminological perspective that advocate the 
studying of ‘crimes and harms’, the recourse to the language of ‘crime’ might 
equally be considered a more useful strategy for engaging key stakeholders 
and bringing about meaningful reform than the language of ‘harm’ alone. In 
the twenty-first century, ‘crime’ has political and public currency as a focus for 
policy intervention in a way that ‘harm’ does not. As a strategic end, it might 
be argued, a clear focus on, say reducing the harms wrought by the criminal 
justice system, or recognising the (often non-criminalised) harms of the 
powerful as analogously harmful to or more harmful than already criminalised 
harms, might be a more clearly defined and realistic site for enacting social 
change than addressing ‘harm’ in its more nebulous and less tangible forms.  
In terms of challenging the practices of the powerful, it is undeniable that the 
use of alternative measures of ‘harm’ has provided an important means for 
disrupting and challenging the organisation and justification of inequalities in 
society perpetuated by the notion of ‘crime’ and the criminal justice system. 
 
In some respects, the tensions between criminology and zemiology and the 
various attempts to polarize or harmonize these perspectives can simply be 
seen as a contemporary rehashing of age-old debates that have occupied 
social theorists concerning the relative weightings given to structure versus 
agency in understanding and responding to human behaviour and the most 
effective routes to effecting meaningful social change by critical scholars.  
However, these are also debates that have long-featured in criminology, long 
before zemiology emerged. As such, to reduce the tension between 
zemiology and criminology to simply these longstanding theoretical questions 
fails to recognise that there is, perhaps, something more at stake. The 
problem is, however, that contemporary infighting between academics as to 
the ‘proper’ relationship between criminology and zemiology risks 
overshadowing this.   
 
For example, Zedner’s criticisms of social harm noted above reflect a 
relatively common theme amongst those resistant to zemiology’s claims to 
offer a preferable alternative to the discourse of crime. Anecdotal personal 
experience suggests a common fear arising in discussions around zemiology 
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is that, through its emphasis on harm rather than crime, and, in particular, its 
commitment to exploring the social determinants of harm, zemiology 
ultimately serves to, at best, neglect crime. At worst, it excuses crime as a 
product of society, thereby absolving culpable individuals from their role in 
enacting harm on the victims of crime. However, this is arguably to 
misunderstand the project of zemiology. The zemiological focus on harm is 
not intended to deny individual culpability for individual acts that result in 
harm, but rather to beg questions as to where responsibility for those harms 
should fall. As its key proponents have highlighted:  
 
“to utilise the social as a departure for explanation and theorising need not, and for us 
does not, entail a rejection of the need to account for human agency.  But it is to 
accept a view of the world that sees human agency as highly delimited by structures, 
structures which must be known and of which we must provide accurate accounts” 
(Hillyard e al., 2004b: 271). 
 
Therefore, the systematic analysis of harm advocated by proponents of the 
zemiological perspective is arguably intended to ensure that, when we are 
holding individuals responsible for harmful behaviours, we are genuinely 
holding them responsible for their deliberate, intentional acts, all other things 
being equal. It is not necessarily seeking to provide an alibi for criminality, but 
seeking to ensure that when we hold people responsible for their behaviours, 
we hold them responsible only for their behaviours, and not for the 
circumstances upon which such behaviours are predicated. The problem, at 
present, for proponents of the zemiologcal perspective is that too often ‘crime’ 
and the criminal justice system are used to deal with what are, ultimately, 
social problems. It is, however, only by addressing those social problems and 
ensuring substantive equality across society that we can hope to legitimately 
make such a distinction. Arguably, the logical conclusion of the social harm 
perspective is not necessarily an abolition of crime nor of the criminal justice 
system (though it would entail its radical reform so as not to exist as a site of 
‘pain delivery’ (Christie, 1981) and harm in and of itself), but rather its 
significant reduction to ensure that we only punish individuals for their 
culpable acts. We can only ensure this, however, once the structures of harm 
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and inequality that permeate our society and too often predicate the 
application of our criminal justice system, are eradicated.  
 
In short, the contemporary context of knowledge production only adds to the 
confusion as to what the relationship between zemiology and criminology is, 
can, or should be and there is a need for clarification if we are to move 
beyond simple academic infighting and demonstrate relevance to the 
contemporary social world. The danger is that the current tendencies to either 
co-option of zemiology within criminology or polarization between zemiology 
and criminology respectively, risk impoverishing both zemiology and 
criminology, whilst such apparently abstract theoretical debates also risk 
occluding what is really at stake in such debates. For example, Hillyard and 
Tombs ([forthcoming]) note the tendency of criminologists to overlook the 
important contributions zemiology has made for the sake of demonstrating the 
superiority of criminology over zemiology. 
 
Instead, were we to engage with other perspectives with more “intellectual 
ambition, political humility” (Loader & Sparks, 2011: 132), we might see that 
the distinction between zemiology and criminology fundamentally lies not in 
their critical assessment of either the criminal justice system nor their analysis 
of the best way of understanding the causes of social problems.  With 
perhaps the exception of genuinely ‘administrative’ criminologies, 
criminologists and zemiologists alike have shown themselves to be concerned 
to critique the criminal justice system as a means of responding to social 
problems. They are also equally concerned to properly recognise and address 
the causes of those social problems, seeking to situate individual behaviour in 
broader social structures.  The tension that arises seems largely to be a 
normative disagreement about the most effective means for recognising and 
addressing these problems, not that these are problems that need 
addressing. Rather than denying this debate through the collapsing of one 
perspective into the other, or polarizing them into hostile camps of mutual 
antipathy, it is, perhaps, incumbent upon all critical scholars to act as 
“democratic under-labourers” (Locke, [1690] 1975 cited in Loader & Sparks, 
2011: 124), recognising our sites of divergence, and fostering dialogue 
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between them if we are to achieve our shared goals and effect meaningful 
change. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, as this discussion has sought to highlight, the danger is that 
existing debates around the relationship between criminology and zemiology, 
tend to do so in the abstract – missing the extent to which such theoretical 
perspectives can and should be understood as normative projects. In this 
aspect, Zedner (2011) is right to highlight the suppression of normativity within 
criminology and the danger this poses for turning criminology into a technical 
discipline for administering criminal justice, but this is a threat that is facing 
contemporary social research more generally (see Copson, 2013). Within 
these normative projects there are sites of agreement – most notably, the 
shared goal for both critical criminologists and proponents of zemiology that 
the role of their intellectual endeavours is to challenge dominant power 
structures and address contemporary inequalities. But there are also sites of 
divergence, and understanding the commitment to the language of ‘harm’ as 
part of a strategy or transpraxis for disrupting dominant ways of thinking is 
central to understanding the project of zemiology.  As such, attempts to simply 
reconcile zemiology with criminology (such as Yar’s (2012a; 2012b)) arguably 
miss the point of zemiology and threaten to reduce what are bold normative 
questions about how to effect change into conceptual problems in need of 
resolution.   
 
Whilst such issues may be of interest to the social theorist, their wider 
significance is less obvious. If we want to move beyond accusations of 
academic navel-gazing and infighting, we need to connect our theoretical 
interests with the real world. And in this respect, one might well question 
whether it really matters what we call ourselves – zemiologists, criminologists, 
academics, activists: what is more important is what we seek to achieve and 
how best we might do so.  By doing so, the hope is that we can move beyond 
what may amount to little more than academic identity-politics towards what 
are, ultimately, political and normative debates about how we might better 
achieve the ends to which we are committed. 
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